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FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS SYMPOSIUM
Judgment and diversity
Thinking with Hannah Arendt about the composition of international court
benches
If the number of female judges in an international tribunal is one out of twenty-one, as in
the case of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), we can assume that
there is a problem. Not because a woman’s judgment would necessarily and predictably
be different, as Selen Kazan has discussed. But, as Nienke Grossman also explains here,
because women are just as qualified to serve as judges, so that such significant
underrepresentation can typically be traced back to mechanisms of exclusion in the
nomination procedures. And while there certainly is not one “female perspective”, the
underrepresentation of women on international court benches does affect also the
outcomes: as illustrates the Feminist Judgments Project that Troy Lavers and Loveday
Hodson have presented, international legal norms and decisions often expose structural
biases and inequitable assumptions. The (diverse!) perspectives of women are needed for
tackling these limitations and for working towards a more inclusionary and just
interpretation of international law.
But how exactly do a critique of biases in the outcomes and of the procedures of
appointment relate? It is not hard to agree that the presence of women on international
court benches matters, both as a claim for equal access, and as a chance for more
informed and legitimate decisions. But it is harder to clearly situate this claim in our
understanding of judgment. It is not hard to agree that something is wrong, but it is
harder to tell how things would be right. Is there a tension between the idea of
impartiality and the very concept of judgment, and criteria of representativeness for the
composition of courts? In this contribution, I will sketch a few thoughts on how Hannah
Arendt’s conception of judgment is helpful in thinking about that question.
Aren’t judges required to be impartial anyway?
Essential to the concept of judgment is the idea that a person can abstract from his or her
immediate situation, what we find reflected in standards such as impartiality,
independence, and “high moral character” (cf. for example Art. 2 of the ICJ Statute, or Art.
21 of the ECHR). The institution of a court relies on the assumption that judges are able to
look beyond their own interests and opinions, and to rule about matters they have never
experienced. A judge deciding about early prison release will usually have no experience
in what it means to be incarcerated. A judge in divorce proceedings may not have gone
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herself through a divorce. And yet it is generally assumed that they will be able to render
a fair decision based on their knowledge about the law and their general life experiences.
At the same time, the standards of independence and impartiality do not mean that any
“good judge” will come to the same conclusion, no matter where she grew up, what
experiences he made, what her cultural background, academic education, personal
challenges were. That the background of judges matters is well accepted in international
courts when it comes to criteria of geographic distribution and of nationality: The rules
of composition of the ITLOS contain requirements for a minimum number of judges from
each geographical area. The rules of the ICC, of the ICJ, and of the IACtHR include
negative criteria that no more than two judges should hold the same nationality.
How can we square the notion of impartiality with claims for more diverse benches?
Where does the dimension of judgment as abstracting from one’s own perspective meet
with the dimension of judgment as making sense of one’s knowledge about the world –
the knowledge, which is certainly different for every person?
Hannah Arendt’s concept of judgment
Human plurality constitutes a central theme in Hannah Arendt’s thought, and in that
connection her concept of judgment provides a valuable source for thinking about
diversity in the context of courts. Arendt deals with judging as one of the three basic
mental activities in her last book “The Life of the Mind” (LotM). Or was planning to deal
with, as she died before writing the third part of the book, the one on judging.
Nevertheless, there is a number of passages about the faculty of judgment in previous
parts of her book and in other writings, most importantly in her “Lectures on Kant’s
Political Philosophy” (LoKPP).
What prompted Arendt to engage with the question of judgment was indeed a court
proceeding: the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961, which she reported for the New Yorker.
Finding the “banality of evil” to lie exactly in the “failure to think” and in the abstention
from proper judgment, Arendt turned in her late work to a systematic consideration of
the human faculty of thinking. This occupation was at the same time one of engaging
with the philosophical traditions of metaphysics, with what Arendt herself labels as the
“reversal of the metaphysical hierarchy”, the turning focus of philosophy towards “the
value of the surface” (LotM, 26).
Judgment and human plurality
Drawing on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Arendt describes the faculty of judgment
as bringing together the general and the particular. This can be in form of determinant
judgment, in which a particular is subsumed under a general, and in form of reflective
judgment, in which one “ascends” from the particular to the general (LotM, 69). Whereas
the former regards the search for cognitive truths, the latter relates to the search for
meaning and understanding.
Reflective judgment for Arendt has an inherently social character: On the one hand,
judgment as mental activity requires a form of withdrawal, it belongs to the vita
contemplativa as opposed to the vita activa. On the other hand, judgment forms the
process, in which we test our views of the world and seek agreement with others. The
practice of judging thus takes place from a position of withdrawal, but still with regard to
the perspective of others, along the criterion of “communicability” (LoKPP, 63 et seq). The
withdrawal of the judge is one to the position of a spectator, outside the activity but not
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without a standpoint, a point of view quite literally. What is crucial in Arendt’s conception
of judgment is the condition of human plurality, thus the move from a spectator in the
singular to a “spectator in the plural”. The standard of judgment implies a perspective of
intersubjectivity: In a first step, judging requires a distance of the spectator from the
object of judgment. But in a second step, judging requires the faculty of “enlarged
thinking”, for which the sense of community and the perspective of others are relevant.
Judgment and human particularity
Human plurality is central for Arendt’s concept of judgment, and so is human
particularity or distinctness. It is human distinctness that makes action and speech
necessary, and forms an irreducible part of human plurality. In judging, a person discloses
herself, and judgment is possible only from one’s own standpoint. In Arendt’s view, the
sense of taste, the most immediate of our senses, forms the paradigm for the idea of
judgment (LotM, 111). The immediacy of taste illustrates the need for an own standpoint,
and the impossibility to abstain from judgment. This impossibility to abstain from
judgment can also be framed as the responsibility of judgment, as it appears in Arendt’s
reflections about the Eichmann trial.
Back to international courts
What can we draw from these reflections about judgment as a human faculty for the
practice of international courts and more specifically the composition of court benches?
Arendt makes clear that the judging person’s own standpoint is an essential part of the
faculty of judgment. The awareness about an own standpoint and the disclosure in action
and speech is not in contradiction with the ability to assume the role of a spectator, to
“withdraw” from activities of political life. Arendt’s reflections thus offer an
understanding of judgment as neither neutral or separate from the person of the judge,
nor as determined by the judge’s identity or as political in the sense of partisanship.
Impartiality, the ability of withdrawal, and reasoning from one’s own standpoint along the
criterion of communicability constitute two aspects of the mental process of judging.
Moreover, human distinctness is not understood as separating, or as determinative for a
person’s views, but as a necessary element in the exchange with others. In that sense,
diversity in the composition of court benches is indeed a question of enriching the
communicative processes in which the court collectively “ascends from the particular to
the general”, interprets the facts of and the law for a particular case. The diverse
composition of international courts is important for tackling inequalities and blind
spots, and so is critical legal scholarship as one reference point of the court decisions’
communicability.
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